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Abstract 
  We present a model of neighborhood effects in wage payment delays.  Positive feedback 
arises because each employer’s arrears affect the late payment costs faced by other firms in the 
same local labor market, resulting in a strategic complementarity in the practice.  The model is 
estimated on panel data for workers and firms in Russia, facilitating identification through the 
use of a rich set of covariates and fixed effects for employees, employers, and local labor 
markets.  We also exploit a policy intervention affecting public sector workers that provides an 
instrumental variable to estimate the endogenous reaction in the non-public sector.  Consistently 
across specifications, the estimated reaction function displays strongly positive neighborhood 
effects, and the estimates of four feedback loops – operating through worker quits, effort, strikes, 
and legal penalties – imply that costs of delays are attenuated by neighborhood arrears.  We also 
study a nonlinear case exhibiting two stable equilibria: a “punctual payment equilibrium” and a 
“late payment equilibrium.”  The estimates imply that the theoretical conditions for multiple 
equilibria under symmetric local labor market competition are satisfied in our data. 
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1.  Introduction 
Timely payment of wage obligations is a standard feature of most employment 
relationships and a virtually universal and unquestioned assumption of economists studying labor 
markets.  In developed market economies, the rule of wage payment in full and on time is proven 
by the rare exceptions appearing in small start-up companies facing severe liquidity constraints, 
in bankrupt firms about to be shut down, or in situations of fraud.  The routine practice among 
employers of honoring their compensation promises is presumably guaranteed both by legal 
institutions and by self-enforcing considerations such as the firm’s interest in protecting its 
reputation as a reliable contractor when hiring and motivating other workers (for reasons 
surveyed by, e.g., Malcomson, 1997). 
In post-Soviet Russia and a few other formerly socialist economies, by contrast, wage 
delays and nonpayments have risen quickly to become large, widespread, and persistent.   
Although aggregate figures are incomplete, estimates from the Russian State Committee for 
Statistics imply that the cumulative overdue wage debt in Russia grew from a negligible level in 
1991 to 77 bln rubles by the end of 1998, with 132,320 enterprises reporting arrears amounting 
to 374 percent of their total monthly wage bill in December of that year (Goskomstat, 1999).  As 
we show in our empirical analysis of microdata below, approximately two-thirds of Russian 
workers reported overdue wages in late 1998, with an average debt of 4.8 monthly salaries per 
affected worker.  Although declining concurrently with rapid economic growth since 1999, 
arrears continue to affect more than five million Russian workers according to a recent trade 
union report (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 2004).  Not only large in magnitude, 
late payments have been widespread in many sectors and types of firms; indeed, the incidence 
and magnitude of arrears appear to be greater in large firms and state-owned organizations.
1 
This paper attempts to explain the puzzle of how high and persistent wage arrears in a 
few economies can co-exist with only negligible, transitory arrears in most others.  Our empirical 
work focuses on Russia, both because of data availability and because the substantial variation of 
arrears within Russia provides a fruitful testing ground for our theory.  But our theoretical model 
is general, applying to wage arrears determination in other transition economies as well as 
providing an explanation why wage arrears are such an uncommon practice in most economies. 
                                                 
1 Gimpelson (1998), Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999), Desai and Idson (2000), and Earle and Sabirianova 
(2002) describe some of the empirical patterns of Russian wage arrears.   2
Our analysis begins with the observation that a combination of peculiar conditions may 
have tended to raise the attractiveness of wage delays in some Russian companies.  The 
conditions include the broad decline of output and employment for many years, the associated 
problems with liquidity, the poor monitoring of managerial behavior, and the general lack of 
contract enforcement.  These conditions may have increased firms’ and managers’ returns to 
delaying wages, but we argue that they alone cannot account for several pronounced empirical 
regularities.  The puzzles include the presence of arrears even at firms showing strong growth 
and liquidity performance, the large geographic variation in the magnitude of overdue wages, the 
tendency for arrears to concentrate in the state-owned sector, the persistence of substantial delays 
over time, and workers’ apparent tolerance of the practice for years on end. 
The key argument we develop in this paper is that self-propagation of the practice of 
wage contract violations may arise due to neighborhood effects among employers within local 
labor markets.  Our claim is that a decision to delay wages by one employer has externalities for 
other firms considering a late payment strategy, particularly for those operating in the same local 
labor market.  The externality arises because employees of a late-paying firm are less likely to 
engage in several costly actions—quitting, reducing effort, or striking—in response to their own 
arrears when other firms in the region also pay late.  Legal congestion may also contribute to a 
positive feedback loop, as the probability of judicial punishment may decline with the incidence 
of arrears in the local jurisdiction (as in Sah, 1991).  In these ways, the cost to a manager of a 
wage delay strategy is a function of the wage delay decisions taken by other firms, and the 
timeliness of payment practice becomes a strategic complement for firms operating in the same 
labor market. 
We present this argument in the form of a model of the managerial choice of wage 
delays, where a critical factor in the decision is the prevalence of arrears in the firm’s local labor 
market.  The model implies neighborhood effects in wage payment practices due to feedback 
loops from the local environment.  Under some conditions, the model generates multiple 
equilibria in the level of wage arrears:  a stable “punctual payment equilibrium,” an unstable 
“critical mass equilibrium,” and a stable “late payment equilibrium.”  The stable equilibria can 
be interpreted as reflecting institutional lock-in, in the case of the late payment equilibrium 
implying that massive coordination may be required to move the economy back to the institution 
of punctual payment.  The model explains not only why arrears may tend to persist, but also   3
some other empirical regularities of arrears:  the strong regional variation, the presence of delays 
at many firms that are expanding employment and wages, the persistence of substantial arrears 
over several years, and the quiescent response of most workers to the practice.  Although 
focusing attention on the effect of interaction among employers in spurring and sustaining 
arrears, the model includes other factors that may have affected firm and worker behavior, and 
thus it suggests important variables that should be controlled for in the empirical analysis. 
Estimating such a model of employer interactions faces similar identification problems to 
those in studies of neighborhood effects and social interactions (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001; 
Moffitt, 2001).  Our identification strategy takes advantage of a policy intervention for a 
subsample of individuals:  employees of organizations financed from the state budget.  The 
exogenous rise of wage arrears in the public sector provides a valid instrument for an analysis of 
the effect of local labor market arrears on the decisions of non-public sector employers.  The 
multi-level and panel aspects of the data allow us to control for correlated effects at the 
individual, firm, and local labor market levels.  In addition to estimating an identified reaction 
function, our empirical work examines some of the assumptions of the model.  Among these are 
the four feedback loops—involving quits, changes in effort, strikes, and legal penalties—that we 
argue may reinforce the use of a wage delay practice.  We also examine the maintained 
hypotheses that wage rates are exogenous in the arrears equation and that public-sector arrears 
are exogenous to arrears behavior in the non-public sector.  The final empirical analysis in the 
paper involves the estimation of a nonlinear form of the reaction function.  As an example of a 
possible nonlinear form, we derive and estimate a cubic function for the neighborhood effects 
among employers.  Assuming symmetric competition in the local labor market and Nash 
behavior by managers, we calculate the three equilibria implied by our empirical estimates. 
The next section of the paper introduces our data.  Section 3 presents a simple model of 
wage arrears determination to motivate our analysis of firm interactions in local labor markets 
and of the feedback loops that may support the use of the wage arrears practice.  Section 4 
describes our identification strategy and presents results for the basic linear reaction function.  
Section 5 contains results for the estimation of feedback loops and other model assumptions.  
The possibility of a nonlinear reaction function is developed theoretically and estimated 
empirically in Section 6.  Section 7 concludes with a brief summary and discussion of some 
wider implications of the analysis.   4
2.  Data 
2.1.  Data Sources 
Our model analyzes the choice of wage arrears in a particular employment relationship 
for a firm and worker.  The data required to test the model include detailed information on both 
sides of the relationship.  To meet these requirements, this paper uses several data sources.  The 
principal source, used in most analyses below, consists of the 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, and 2000 
waves of a household panel survey, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), based 
on the first national probability sample drawn in the Russian Federation.
2  The panel structure is 
particularly useful in permitting us to employ individual, firm, and district fixed effects in our 
estimating equations. 
For the purpose of our analysis, we have extended the original RLMS data in a number of 
ways.  First, we have used information provided by most working respondents on their 
employers (but not included in the published data set) to identify individual firms and the 
industries in which they operate.
3  This allowed us to control for constant firm heterogeneity and 
time-varying industry of employment.  Another important benefit of our ability to identify the 
specific employer for most observations was that it enabled us to construct reliable measures of 
job mobility.  We can distinguish job quits reliably from intrafirm mobility, and we can measure 
job tenure accurately.  These are critical variables in our theoretical model. 
A second major data source is a detailed survey of agricultural and industrial employers, 
which collected information on wage arrears and other aspects of firms for the period 1991–99.  
Our sampling design attempted to interview every identifiable employer of RLMS respondents, 
thus constituting a national probability sample of employers in industry and agriculture, with 
selection probability proportional to employment size.
4  Unlike most surveys of firms, our 
procedure did not replace nonresponding firms with other observations, and interviewers 
expended great efforts to include every firm on their sample lists.  As a result of this procedure, 
                                                 
2 See Swafford et al. (1997). The RLMS data contain results of two longitudinal surveys of more than 10,000 
individuals during a first wave in 1992-1993 (Rounds 1–4) and a second wave in 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 
2001 (Rounds 5–10).  No information on wage arrears is available in the first wave, and availability of firm 
information restricts our attention in this paper to Rounds 5–9 from the second wave.   
3 Some ambiguities of classification prevented us from coding industry for all jobs, but we were able to code the 
following number of cases:  4828 respondents of 4896 employed in 1994, 4528 of 4575 employed in 1995, 4346 of 
4383 employed in 1996, 4215 of 4250 employed in 1998, and 4449 of 4508 employed in 2000. 
4 This statement is of course conditional on the RLMS sampling, which involves a two-stage geographic 
stratification procedure followed by random drawing of households (residences).  Again, see Swafford et al. (1997) 
for details.    5
the response rate was approximately 64 percent among industrial firms (522 firms) and 73 
percent among agricultural firms (75 firms).   Missing values for the wage arrears variable 
reduce the sample to 560 firms, of which 486 come from the industrial firm survey and 74 from 
the agricultural firm survey.  We also have added regional data from the Russian Labor Ministry 
Inspection Service on the patterns of violations of the Russian Labor Code and how the cases 
were treated.  These data are useful in constructing measures of the effectiveness of the legal 
enforcement regime in the region. 
2.2.  Measuring Wage Arrears 
Measuring wage arrears is subject to several problems.  In practice, arrears tend to 
accumulate irregularly, with occasional, lumpy repayments of back wages.  In theory, one might 
like to measure the present discounted loss due to wage delays taking into account the risk 
premium associated with the uncertainty of the timing (and probability) of future payment.  Such 
a measure would require detailed information on the salary history of each worker and on his/her 
discount rate and expectations concerning future payment. 
Accounting practice in Russia––both at the individual firm level and by Goskomstat—
instead focuses on the cumulative debt of the firm to its workers, without regard to the timing of 
the overdue payments.  The stock of overdue wage debt is frequently expressed in terms of the 
monthly wage bills (payrolls) the firm owes.
5  Workers think of the value of arrears in the same 
way:  the number of monthly salaries that have not yet been paid.  This question is asked directly 
on the RLMS, and this is the measure of individual wage arrears (denoted ω) that we analyze in 
this paper. 
As shown in Table 1, the unconditional mean of ω rose from 1994 to 1996 and again in 
1998 before falling in 2000; the distribution of the variable shows pronounced rightward shifts in 
1996 and 1998.  The proportion of workers with two or more months of arrears was already 
about 25 percent in 1994, and it had increased to nearly 44 percent by 1996 and 50 percent by 
late 1998.  Conditional on having arrears, the expected magnitude rose from 2.8 to more than 4.8 
months.  Clearly the overall increase in arrears reflects both a spreading of the contagion to 
previously unaffected workers and a worsened condition for those already affected. 
In our empirical tests of the model’s hypotheses, we construct a measure of local arrears 
(Ω) from the RLMS by aggregating ω up to the district (rayon) level, each time omitting the 
                                                 
5 Wages are paid monthly in Russia, as in most European countries.   6
particular firm for which the individual worker is employed.  While analyses of Russian regions 
are frequently conducted at the level of the oblast, we feel that the district much better reflects 
the scope of the local labor market.
6  Table 1 shows the substantial variation across districts:  the 
cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg had trivial levels of arrears, for instance, while in some 
other districts average arrears reached as high as 12 monthly wages per employee. 
2.3.  Sample Characteristics 
Table 2 displays means and standard deviations for worker and job characteristics in the 
RLMS sample.  The sample is restricted to employees at their primary job.  36.7 percent are 
employed in the public sector, which is defined on the basis of industries paid through the state 
budget in Russia:  defense industries, municipal utilities, health services, social work, education, 
culture and art, science, public administration, and public order and safety.  Definitions of most 
individual attributes (such as gender, age, job tenure, years of schooling, employee ownership, 
occupation, and industry) are straightforward.  The hourly wage rate is computed as the ratio of 
the contractual wage in the previous month to the usual hours of work in the previous month.
7  
Family income includes per capita income (monetary and in-kind) received during the past 
month from all jobs, as well as the retirement and unemployment benefits of all other members 
of the household.  All income measures are calculated in constant December 2000 prices using 
the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
Previous studies have found that wage arrears are more common among men, negatively 
associated with schooling, and positively related to age and job tenure; these may reflect 
considerations of skill specificities, mobility costs, and outside opportunities.
8  Workers with 
arrears are more likely to be small shareholders and tend to have lower hourly wages and family 
incomes.  Craft workers and operators and assemblers tend to experience the highest rates, while 
managers have the lowest—although the rate is high even for this occupation.  Variation across 
                                                 
6 There are 89 oblasts or “subjects” (including autonomous republics, etc.) of the Russian Federation, some of which 
are larger than Texas, others of which are as small as Rhode Island.  The next lower administrative level is the 
rayon, of which there are an average of 22 per oblast, thus roughly equivalent to a county in the U.S.  In our data, 
there are 52 rayons, thus 52 different values of Ω in each year of the RLMS sample. 
7 Because wage arrears introduce high volatility in the wage as measured in a given reference period, the reported 
wage is frequently zero (as high as 30 percent of responses by workers), and it will be lower than the contractual 
wage when new wage debts are incurred and higher than the contractual wage when they are paid off.  To handle the 
problem of measuring the contractual wage, we have added an additional question to the RLMS in 1998 and 2000 to 
collect this information, and for the earlier years we have followed the method of Earle and Sabirianova (2002), 
imputing the contractual wage as the ratio of the total wage debt to the number of monthly wages owed (ω). 
8 Earlier versions of the paper contained information on the incidence and magnitude of arrears for each 
characteristic separately; these results are available on request.  See also Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti (1999), 
Desai and Idson (2000), and Earle and Sabirianova (2002).   7
industries is also large, with higher incidence and magnitude in agriculture, defense and heavy 
industrial sectors, as well as in services financed through the state budget (education and health).  
In a new and rapidly developing sector like banking and finance, however, arrears are very small. 
Summary statistics for the firm sample are provided in Table 3.  Compared with the 
worker reports in Tables 1 and 2, mean ω and Ω are somewhat smaller in the firm data (although 
variation in these two variables is quite similar across sources).  There are two reasons for the 
difference:  the time span begins earlier in the firm survey (as early as 1991 for some firms), and 
the firm survey excludes most of the public sector.  The latter consideration prevents us from 
estimating an identified reaction function using the firm survey and following the estimation 
strategy described in Section 4; the firm survey data are therefore employed only in the 
estimation of some of the feedback loops associated with costs of arrears. 
Table 3 also shows characteristics of the firm sample used as controls:  union density, 
provision of fringe benefits, training costs, industry, local type, and legal environment.  These 
variables, as well as the quit rate and the incidence of strikes and legal penalties, are introduced 
in the empirical sections below. 
3.  A Model of Wage Arrears 
In this section, we present a highly stylized model of managerial decisions concerning 
wage delays.  The model is designed to focus attention on the possibility of neighborhood effects 
in arrears through the influence of the behavior of other employers in the local labor market on 
the decision of a firm concerning the practice.  It is also useful as a framework for considering 
several types of feedback loops that may support the use or nonuse of the late payment practice, 
for laying out critical assumptions in the analysis, and for suggesting important factors to control 
for in the empirical work.  Although arrears decisions have an important dynamic component, 
including the expectations of managers and workers concerning each other’s behavior and the 
evolution of exogenous determinants, our static model captures the essential features of arrears 
we would like to describe.
9 
The main result of the model is a general reaction function that relates an individual 
firm’s arrears behavior to the prevalence of arrears in the firm’s local labor market.  This 
reaction function is assumed to apply only to firms in the non-public sector of the economy, as 
                                                 
9 In addition, it is problematic to estimate a dynamic model because of the shortness and low frequency of the time 
series available.   8
public sector arrears are affected by centralized decisions concerning the payments of obligations 
and the distribution of revenue-sharing across different levels of government.
10  This assumption 
forms an important basis for our identification strategy in empirically estimating the linear form 
of the reaction function in Section 4; further discussion and evidence on the issue is provided in 
Section 5. 
3.1.  Returns and Costs to Wage Arrears 
Consider a non-public firm with a single manager who chooses the level of back wages 
owed a particular employee in a particular time period to maximize his/her private net benefits.
11  
This level, ω, can be thought of as an involuntary loan from the worker to the firm, and we 
assume it earns the manager a gross per-period return of net present value R(ω, X), with marginal 
return Rω(X) = r(X) assumed to be constant in ω but varying according to some characteristics of 
the firm, X (defined so that rx > 0).  The relevant characteristics may include the liquidity needs 
of the firm, the effective interest rate that it faces in borrowing from other sources, and the ability 
of the manager to appropriate the returns by diverting the funds to projects earning private 
benefits.  In Russia until August 1998, for example, poorly monitored managers could invest 
spare funds in short-term government treasury bills (GKOs), earning rates up to 150 percent.  In 
such situations, wage arrears are likely to be more attractive to managers who can relatively 
easily and secretly channel the extra cash flow to their own purposes. 
While it is not difficult to appreciate the potential returns that might be obtained from 
postponing wage payments, the manager naturally faces costs of wage arrears as well.  We 
hypothesize several types of potential costs:  increased worker turnover, lowered effort, and 
higher probabilities of strikes and legal penalties.
12  Our argument with respect to each of these is 
that the associated costs are positive functions of ω on the margin, but that this positive 
relationship is attenuated by the magnitude of arrears in the rest of the firm’s local labor market, 
Ω.  The rationale for each type of cost is fairly straightforward, and we provide evidence on the 
form of the costs in the empirical analysis below. 
                                                 
10 What we call “public” might also be referred to as “budgetary,” as these organizations are dependent on the state 
budget for their support.  We use the term “non-public” (rather than “private”) because of full or partial state 
ownership in many firms. 
11 The model would be little affected were we to assume profit maximization instead, but our assumption of 
managerial utility maximization is less restrictive, and we are uncomfortable with characterizing Russian firms, in 
particular, as profit maximizers.  
12 Although we do not assume profit maximization, these costs to the firm reduce the rents that the manager can take 
out of the firm, implying that they should matter to the manager as well.    9
A first type of cost arises because delaying wages may increase quits, if the worker 
responds by leaving for other employments or exiting the labor force altogether.  We assume that 
quits impose costs Q of replacement, associated with the need for hiring, screening, and training 
new employees (as in, e.g., Oi, 1962; or Stiglitz, 1974).  The quit decision is not modeled 
explicitly, but we assume the manager knows the probability of the worker quitting as a function 
of ω and Ω; and we hypothesize a negative impact of Ω on the worker’s quit response to arrears 
and thus on the firm’s marginal cost of arrears.  Ω affects the quit responsiveness to ω negatively 
because it reduces the attractiveness of mobility to other firms.  Because workers differ in their 
mobility costs and outside opportunities, we permit the quit function to vary with a set of 
characteristics such as current compensation (wages and benefits), firm-specificity of skills, 
mobility costs, and local labor market conditions included in the Z
Q vector, so that Q(ω, Ω, Z
Q), 
with Qω > 0 and QωΩ < 0. 
Wage delays may also affect worker productivity.  If morale declines in response to 
arrears and if effort is not perfectly observable, then workers may be more likely to shirk or 
even, in extreme cases, to sabotage the firm.  Where workers have some discretion over their 
hours of work, they may reduce the amount of time on the job.  We summarize these agency 
issues under the rubric of “effort costs,” E, and assume that the manager expects that higher 
arrears may reduce the worker’s productivity through mechanisms similar to those discussed in 
the efficiency wage literature (Akerlof, 1982; Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).  Such costs are likely 
to be greater for some types of workers than for others; we parameterize this heterogeneity as a 
set of worker characteristics, Z
E, which could include factors such as the importance of morale 
for productivity, the difficulty of monitoring, and the degree of independence the worker has in 
decision-making.  We hypothesize that the negative effort effect is attenuated by wage arrears in 
the rest of the firm’s local labor market, Ω, as workers’ effort decisions are influenced by their 
outside alternatives (for instance, if they are caught shirking and fired) and perhaps by their 
perceptions of the practice’s fairness or legitimacy.  The effort costs may thus be written as 
E(ω, Ω, Z
E), with the critical properties Eω > 0 and EωΩ < 0. 
Another type of cost results if arrears increase strikes and other forms of protest behavior, 
resulting in costs summarized by S(ω, Ω, Z
S).  Again, we assume a positive relationship that is 
attenuated by arrears in the local labor market, such that Sω > 0 and SωΩ < 0.  The argument here 
is that, as with bargaining patterns frequently observed in unionized firms in market economies,   10
workers view arrears in the context of what is “normal” in their environment, and they are less 
likely to protest their own wage delays when their friends and neighbors are also being paid late 
by their employers.  The probability of such behavior is likely to be a function of other 
characteristics of the firm and worker, particularly the extent of unionization, included in a set of 
exogenous variables Z
S.
13 
A final type of cost arises because wage arrears are violations of legal contracts, resulting 
in possible legal penalties and associated costs L(ω, Ω, Z
L).
14  Again, we hypothesize that the 
probability of these events is positively related to the level of arrears in the firm, but that the 
strength of the relationship is lower in jurisdictions with higher arrears, such that Lω > 0 and LωΩ 
< 0.  Our main argument is that the legal system in a region may become congested with arrears 
cases, reducing the probability of punishment, similar to Sah’s (1991) analysis of the probability 
of punishment falling with the crime rate.  An additional factor could be a reduced tendency for 
workers to file lawsuits in an environment of high arrears, both because they would be more 
likely to perceive arrears as normal and legitimate and because they may be more pessimistic 
about the chances of resolving the problem through legal channels.  When analyzing the impact 
of local labor market arrears on the relationship between legal penalties and wage arrears of a 
firm, it is also important to take into account regional variation in the effectiveness of the legal 
system stemming from factors other than the congestion and lawsuit filing effects, Z
L. 
To summarize, managers face four costs of wage arrears:  E, Q, S, and L, each of which is 
a function of ω, Ω, and some shift variables, the vector Z.  Although the costs are not directly 
observable, some proxies for the underlying behavior can be measured, which we exploit in our 
empirical work.  For convenience in the exposition of the rest of the model, we consider the sum 
of the four costs C(ω, Ω, Z) = E(ω, Ω, Z
E) + Q(ω, Ω, Z
Q) + S(ω, Ω, Z
S) + L(ω, Ω, Z
L), with Cω > 
0, and CωΩ < 0 so that the marginal cost is declining with local labor market arrears.  Z = (Z
E, Z
Q, 
Z
S, Z
L) is a vector of other factors affecting marginal costs (defined so that CωZ > 0) such as 
worker compensation and fringe benefits, skill specificity, search costs, difficulty of monitoring, 
                                                 
13 Our choice of these variables and our analysis of Russian strike behavior more generally are motivated by the 
broader literature on strikes; see, e.g., Kennan (1986).  Our hypothesis that strike behavior in response to arrears is 
partially a function of arrears in the local labor market is related to the standard notion that employees may gauge 
their wage and benefit demands to those in some reference firm or sector, as in “pattern bargaining” and use of “pay 
comparabilities;” see Levinson (1960) for an early discussion, and Lee and Pesaran (1993) for a more recent 
empirical analysis. 
14 The Russian Labor Code explicitly requires on-time payment of wages, and firms may be called to account by the 
civil courts (when workers file a lawsuit) or the Ministry of Labor’s Inspection Service.  The latter has been known 
to fine managers as well as firms, and, more rarely, to order managerial dismissal.    11
strength of worker organization, functioning of the legal system, and characteristics of the local 
labor market.  Our empirical analysis of model assumptions in Section 5 considers the hypothesis 
that the marginal cost of ω is decreasing in Ω for each component of costs separately.  Using 
proxies for each component, the assumptions may be directly tested:  the negative effects of a 
worker’s arrears on measures of her morale and work hours are declining in absolute value with 
the level of arrears in the local labor market, and the positive effects of arrears on quits, strikes, 
and legal penalties are similarly attenuated by local labor market arrears. 
3.2.  The Reaction Function: ϖ = f (Ω, X, Z ) 
The manager chooses ω  to maximize the expected net return to wage arrears π: 
) , , ( ) , ( max Z C X R Ω − = ω ω π
ω
, (1) 
where ω is the amount of back wages owed to the worker and Ω is the average amount of wage 
arrears in the local labor market outside the firm.   
The first and second order conditions for the manager’s problem (1) are as follows: 
0 ) , , ( ) ( = − =
∂
∂
Z C X r Ω ω
ω
π
ω  (2) 
0
2
2
< − =
∂
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C , (3) 
implying the following optimality condition: 
() ) , , ( Z C X r Ω = ϖ ω . (4) 
The reaction function can be derived as: 
) , , ( Z X f Ω = ϖ . (5) 
Total differentiation of the first order condition yields: 
. 0 = − Ω − − Ω dZ C d C d C dX r Z X ω ω ωω ω   (6) 
Taking each of the exogenous variables X  and Z in turn, and making use of the 
assumptions and the result in equation (3), we can derive the following comparative static results 
for the impact on ω:   12
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Thus, wage arrears should be positively related to the firm’s cost of capital and to the 
ability of managers to appropriate cash flow and earn private benefits.  They should be 
negatively related to the difficulty of monitoring the worker, to the value of the worker’s outside 
alternatives, to the strength of worker organization, and to the effectiveness of the legal system.  
Finally, factors that reduce quit rate increase the probability of having wage arrears (specific 
human capital, employee ownership, high search and mobility costs, etc.). 
Differentiating the reaction function (5) with respect to Ω (while holding constant the 
variables in X and Z) yields: 
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ωω
ω ω
C
C
d
d
 (8) 
Thus, a direct implication of our model is that wage payment decisions exhibit positive 
neighborhood effects.  In the next section, we present our empirical estimates of a linear reaction 
function, followed by an empirical analysis of model assumptions (in Section 5) and an example 
of a nonlinear reaction function implying the possibility of multiple equilibria (in Section 6). 
4.  Estimating the Linear Reaction Function 
  Our first tests of the model focus on the most important implication, the positive slope of 
the reaction function (∂ω/∂Ω > 0).  We also examine the model implications that proxies for X 
raise ω and that proxies for Z lower ω, while postponing analysis of the feedback loops and other 
model assumptions until the next section.  We first discuss our identification strategy and then 
present results. 
4.1.  Identification Strategy  
To test for positive feedback in the reaction function, we assume a linear functional form 
for equation (5).  Estimating the function directly by ordinary least squares (OLS) raises the 
standard identification problems in any model of social interactions, which are discussed by 
Manski (1993) and Moffitt (2001).  As an illustration of these potential problems, consider the   13
following model of endogenous interactions for two firms (for simplicity, each with one 
employee), indexed by i and k: 
() ijt t ijt ijt jt i ijt u D Z X + + + + Ω + = − τ β β β β ω 3 2 1 0  
() kjt t kjt kjt jt k kjt u D Z X + + + + Ω + = − τ β β β β ω 3 2 1 0  (9) 
where ωijt is the number of unpaid monthly wages of firm i in district j in period t; Ω(-i)jt is the 
level of wage arrears in the rest of the firm’s local labor market (district) j in period t; Xijt and Zijt 
are the vectors of observable factors affecting returns to and cost of using wage arrears, 
respectively; Dt is a set of year dummy variables; and the u’s are error terms. 
A first problem could arise if error terms are correlated because of correlated 
unobservables.  Examples of such variables that could produce Cov(uijt, ukjt) ≠ 0 in our model 
include differences across districts in resources, demand conditions, legal environment, or social 
norms such as tolerance towards contract violation.  A second potential reason for correlation of 
the error terms could be endogeneity due to firm interdependence in the level of wage arrears:  
ωijt ⇒Ω(-k)jt ⇒ωkjt ⇒Ω(-i)jt⇒ωijt—what Manski (1993) refers to as the “reflection problem.”  In 
these cases, βOLS is biased and inconsistent. 
The problem of correlated unobservables may be handled by exploiting the panel features 
of the data. 
() ijt j t ijt ijt jt i ijt D Z X ε θ τ β β β ω + + + + + Ω = − 3 2 1 , (10) 
where  Xijt and Zijt include time-varying observable characteristics; θj are local labor market 
(district) fixed effects with observable (e.g., urban characteristics, local infrastructure, and access 
to resources) and unobservable (e.g., common preferences and social norms) components.  We 
also exploit the presence of many firms with multiple workers in our data and the existence of 
multiple observations on each worker in the panel, permitting us to include firm and worker 
fixed effects and take into account variation in fixed unobserved heterogeneity along these 
dimensions. 
The second issue is how to identify the firm interaction effect.  Our identification 
strategy, inspired by a suggestion concerning social interactions in Moffitt (2001), is to search 
for interventions that alter the wage arrears practice for some workers but not for the others.  To 
this end, we exploit the fact that non-payment of wages in the public sector is driven by a   14
different process—governmental financing and revenue-sharing decisions—than wage delays in 
the non-public sector, which are driven by the considerations in our model. 
Thus, the identification solution is to use arrears practice in the public sector to identify 
neighborhood effects in the non-public sector.  The model becomes 
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 (11) 
where p denotes public sector.  The identifying assumption here is that Ω(-p)jt, the level of wage 
arrears in the rest of the firm’s local labor market (district) j in period t, does not enter the 
equation for  pjt ω — in other words, that wage arrears in the public sector are determined by 
bureaucratic decisions in the federal and regional governments that are unrelated to arrears of 
non-public firms in the local area.  We provide further discussion and evidence on the validity of 
this assumption in Section 5.2 below. 
In these equations (11), Ω(-i)jt equals the sum of average wage arrears in the public and 
non-public sectors, weighted by the share of workers in the corresponding sectors: 
() p p
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where  kjt ω and  pjt ω  are the average wage arrears in the public and non-public sectors 
respectively (again excluding firm i), and np is the share of workers in the public sector.  The first 
term in Ω(-i)jt is endogenous, while the last term is exogenous.  Therefore, our method employs 
p n pjt ω , the average arrears in the public sector weighted by the share of workers in the public 
sector in district j, as an instrument.  This variable captures both the magnitude of average arrears 
that appear exogenously and the relative share of this exogenous component in total regional 
arrears. 
  A third potential identification issue in estimating the wage arrears reaction function is 
the possibility that the reference group (district in our case) is endogenous (Moffitt, 2001).   
Analogous to the choice of peer group in studies of teenage behavior (e.g., Evans, Oates, and 
Schwab, 1992) it is possible that firms and workers sort themselves across districts in terms of   15
their returns, costs, and tolerance of arrears.  The clustering of arrears within districts might 
merely reflect the tendency for similar agents to locate close to one another.  Our inclusion of 
district-level fixed effects controls for this possibility, but in any case such geographic sorting 
seems quite implausible, particularly in the Russian case.  An oft-noted feature of Russian labor 
markets is the low geographic mobility of labor, possibly due to information problems, poorly 
functioning housing markets, or liquidity problems of Russian workers (Mitchneck and Plane, 
1995; Heleniak, 1997; Friebel and Guriev, 2002; and Andrienko and Guriev, 2004).  All 
evidence implies that Russian regions are poorly integrated, and worker (and firm) mobility 
across regions can act only slowly to affect regional differences. 
4.2.  Results 
  Our model and discussion of identification issues suggest the value of alternative 
approaches to estimation.  We provide OLS results of the reaction function as a baseline, and 
then report various combinations of instrumental variables (IV) and worker, firm, and district 
fixed effects.  Whenever possible, we compute robust standard errors that are adjusted for 
clustering on districts.  These estimation results are shown in Table 4.  In fact, the estimated β 
(the coefficient on Ω) varies rather little across specifications, remaining in the range from 0.77 
to 1.03.  Instrumenting and including fixed worker effects raises estimated β slightly, while 
including fixed effects for districts or firms tends to reduce it slightly.  The analysis provides 
strong evidence for neighborhood effects in the decision to violate the wage contract and delay 
payment. 
  Many of the results for the Z variables included in the table are statistically insignificant, 
but the negative effect of tenure is consistent with the interpretation that longer tenured workers 
tend to have relatively poor outside alternatives (Lehmann, Wadsworth, and Acquisti, 1999; 
Earle and Sabirianova, 2002).  The magnitude of the point estimates are not large, however, 
suggesting an additional overdue wage debt of about one month for a worker with 30 years of 
tenure compared to a newly hired worker.  The hourly wage enters only weakly, a relationship 
we return to in Section 5.2.  A final noteworthy result is the positive impact of small share 
ownership on arrears in every specification.  One interpretation of this finding is that managers 
are seeking to acquire shares from their workers, as discussed in Earle and Sabirianova (2002).  
Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the notion that wage arrears are the result of some   16
voluntary agreement between workers and firms, again a subject to which we return in Section 
5.2. 
  The bottom part of the table shows the first stage results for the IV estimates.  The 
instrument ( p n pjt ω ) is highly statistically significant and, as hypothesized, is estimated to have 
a positive effect on Ω(-i)jt. 
5.  Feedback Loops and Model Assumptions 
  This section presents an empirical analysis of model assumptions.  Section 5.1 considers 
the costs to the manager of using wage arrears and the possibility that these produce feedback 
loops that may increase the strength of neighborhood effects.  Section 5.2 considers two 
important exogeneity assumptions:  the exogeneity of the wage in the arrears equation and the 
exogeneity of arrears in the public sector. 
5.1.  Estimating the Feedback Loops 
We draw upon both the worker and the firm data to construct proxy variables for the four 
types of costs of arrears discussed in the model, and summary statistics for these variables are 
displayed in Tables 2 and 3.  The variables for “quits,” “hours of work,” and “desire to switch 
jobs” are measured from the RLMS, while “quit rate,” “strikes and other forms of protest,” and 
“legal penalties” are drawn from the enterprise survey.  The first two variables proxy effort 
decisions by workers:  work hours are reported actual hours on the job, and “desire to switch 
jobs” is a dummy variable in response to a direct question on this issue.  We argue that these 
proxy for morale and job satisfaction, variables likely to influence effort; in addition, it is 
sometimes argued that Russian workers reduce their hours in response to arrears (Aslund, 1997), 
providing an additional motivation for examining the effects of ω and Ω on work hours.   
We analyze two measures of quits.  The first, based on the RLMS panel, defines a quit as 
no longer working for the employer two years later.  This measure includes all types of 
separations, but available evidence strongly indicates that the share of involuntary separations is 
very low in Russia—generally less than 10 percent of all separations.
15  The second measure, 
based on the firm survey data, includes voluntary separations only, is expressed as a ratio to 
average firm employment, and refers to a one-year period.   
                                                 
15 Brown and Earle (2003), for example, report the average separation rate in Russian manufacturing from 1990 to 
1999 was 26.51 percent, but the layoff rate was only 2.27 percent.   17
The final two potential costs of arrears are also measured at the firm level.  “Strikes” 
refer not only to formal work stoppages but also to other forms of protests, such as hunger strikes 
and work slowdowns.  The data imply they are much more common in firms reporting wage 
arrears than in those not, and wage arrears were by far the most commonly cited reason for 
strikes by firms reporting them in response to a direct question.  “Legal penalties” refer 
specifically to fines for wage arrears, which may be imposed by either a civil court or the 
Inspection Service.  Both of these are dummy variables, and their means over the firm-years in 
the sample are shown in Table 3.  The incidence of both variables is very low in the early 1990s 
but becomes more substantial in the second half of the decade. 
Recall from Section 3.1 the model assumptions of Cω > 0 and CωΩ < 0:  the costs to using 
wage arrears exhibit positive feedback in the sense that the costs of arrears are reduced on the 
margin when other firms in the local labor market tend to have higher arrears.  If this is correct, 
then each of these types of costs represents a feedback loop that contributes to self-propagation 
of wage arrears. 
  The critical assumption of a negative cross-partial derivative may be directly tested using 
an interaction term in each equation.  The relationship between the costs of using wage arrears 
and the wage arrears environment can be presented in linear form as follows: 
() () ijt j t D ijt Z jt i ijt jt i ijt ijt C ε θ τ γ ω ω β β ω ω β + + + + − Ω Ω + − Ω Ω + = , (13) 
where Cijt are proxy measures for wage arrears costs such as hours of work, desire to switch jobs, 
quits, strikes, and legal penalties; ωijt is the number of unpaid monthly wages of individual i 
working in district j in period t; Ω(-i)jt is the level of wage arrears in the rest of the firm’s local 
labor market (district) j  in period t;  Zijt is a vector of time-varying observable individual 
characteristics (hourly wage rate, family income, schooling, tenure, occupation, and employee 
ownership) and firm characteristics (industry, union density, fringe benefits, and training costs); 
Dt is the set of year dummy variables; and θj are local labor market (district) fixed effects. 
Table 5 shows estimates for the functions with quit behavior, the desire to change jobs, 
and hours of work as dependent variables from the worker survey.  The impact of ω on a 
worker’s hours and desire to switch jobs is reduced by Ω (so that EωΩ < 0).  Computing 
∂(Hours)/∂ω at alternative levels of Ω, we find that workers in low-Ω regions reduce their hours 
in response to their own arrears, so that if Ω = 0, hours fall 1.46 hours per month for each one   18
month increase in ω.  But ∂(Hours)/∂ω falls as Ω rises, and at Ω = 8.6 months, the effect 
vanishes entirely.  Similarly, the probability that an individual reports a desire to switch jobs, our 
proxy for job satisfaction, increases by 2.4 percent for each month of ω in regions where Ω = 0.  
Given an overall average probability of 36 percent, this effect implies that an individual who has 
six months arrears and lives in a low arrears region would be 50 percent more likely to desire a 
job change compared to an otherwise identical neighbor with no wage arrears.  But the effect 
declines with Ω such that the point estimates suggest it becomes negligible at about Ω = 10. 
Table 5 results concerning the vector of Z controls in the regressions are fairly standard:  
the hours equation shows a slight tendency towards backward-bending in the hourly wage rate 
(the magnitude suggests that a 1000 ruble increase in the wage, about 11 percent, would decrease 
hours by 1.25 hours per month), while non-labor (family) income has a negative sign, and male 
gender, schooling, and age are all positively associated with hours.  The regression for desire to 
switch jobs shows that the probability declines with the contractual wage and with job tenure. 
  Table 5 also shows the estimated quit function using individual data.  Again, the results 
imply Qω > 0 and QωΩ < 0 for this component of costs.  The estimated derivative of the quit 
probability with respect to ω implies that workers quit in response to their own arrears when Ω is 
less than ten months, but when Ω is greater, the quit response to ω becomes negative.  This clear 
finding in the data provides additional strong evidence for our hypothesis that wage arrears are 
strategic complements for managers of firms operating in the same local labor market.  Results 
for the Z controls show that male gender is positively associated while schooling and tenure are 
negatively associated with the quit probability. 
The estimates of the cost feedback functions using the firm survey data are shown in 
Table 6.  In these regressions, we specify the Z vector to include industry, union density 
(percentage of employees who are union members), provision of fringe benefits (training, 
kindergartens, and housing), and training costs for new employees (measured as number of days 
required in initial training).  Unionism may influence the propensity to strike, and it may 
influence quit decisions (exit versus voice strategies) as well (e.g., Freeman, 1980).  Fringe 
benefits have been argued to influence the attachment of workers to their employers (Layard and 
Richter, 1995; and Friebel and Guriev, 2002).  Training requirements play an important role in 
replacing workers who have quit.  The summary statistics for all these controls are presented in 
Table 3.   19
Because strikes and legal penalties did not occur in some of the districts, we cannot 
include district fixed effects in the probit analysis.  Instead, we use the type of location (capital 
city, other city, and non-city) and proxies for the legal environment.  The latter measures are 
drawn from data of the Russian Ministry of Labor’s Inspection Service, and they pertain to the 
subject of the Russian Federation in which the firm is located in the year 1997.  The first variable 
reports the ratio of the uncollected fines to the total number of fines assessed on managers 
because of labor violations.  We interpret this variable as reflecting (inversely) the strength of the 
legal system in carrying out at least those punishments it does assess:  managers would have 
relatively little to fear in regions where this ratio is high.  Although the mean of the variable is 
low, the standard deviation is substantial.  The second variable is the ratio of the number of cases 
where wage arrears were paid off to the number of violations found by the Inspection Service.  
This variable we interpret as directly related to the enforcement regime, and its low level 
indicates that even when the policing agency has discovered a violation it is rather unlikely to be 
remedied.  The lower level for firms reporting wage arrears, relative to those reporting none, is 
consistent with legal congestion preventing the Inspection Service from enforcing the labor laws 
and contracts.  These two variables are included in the Z vector of controls when we estimate the 
cost function for legal penalties.   
Again the data show that Ω tends to lessen the impact of ω on costs to the firm of using 
arrears:  QωΩ < 0, SωΩ < 0, and LωΩ < 0.  The data provide consistently strong support for the 
negative cross-derivative, implying positive feedback to the use of the wage arrears practice.  
The magnitudes imply that the quit rate and the probability of protesting wage arrears declines to 
zero when Ω = 5; with respect to legal penalties the probability reaches zero at Ω = 4.  These 
costs of wage arrears are virtually vanishing in the observed range of behavior. 
The control variables of union density, training provision, and the level of training costs 
are estimated to reduce the quit rate.  The effect of union density on the strike probability is 
statistically insignificant, a result consistent with some observers’ assessments that Russian 
unions tend to be weak (e.g., Gimpelson and Lippoldt, 2001).  The fraction of cases when 
managers failed to pay assessed fines on time is estimated to have a negative impact on the 
probability of legal penalties, which we interpret as a reflection of the effectiveness of local legal 
institutions.  The negative impact of the second variable, the fraction of cases when arrears were 
paid off after the violation was discovered, is a bit more puzzling:  it may simply reflect the fact   20
that penalties are less likely to be assessed when managers quickly pay after they are found out.  
In any case, the results for all four components of costs strongly support the hypothesis of a 
positive feedback loop in each case, suggesting there may be increasing returns to the use of 
wage arrears. 
5.2.  Other Model Assumptions 
We argue in this paper that it is reasonable to treat wage rates as exogenous in the data 
generating process for wage arrears.  The assumption follows from understanding the institutions 
of wage determination and contract negotiation in Russia, where wages in large companies, 
responsible for most arrears, are determined in collective bargaining agreements at a frequency 
of one or two years.  The decisions on arrears—whether to delay payment, to pay partial wages, 
and to repay any overdue back wages—are taken monthly.  Thus, at the moment of deciding on 
arrears, the wage is predetermined.  Moreover, there is no negotiation of wage arrears in 
collective bargaining.  The concept of such a negotiation is a logical self-contradiction involving 
a contract to violate a contract.  It would be completely unenforceable, even more than the 
contractual wage rates themselves.
16  Wage arrears cannot be specified, agreed to, and fixed ex 
ante; by their very nature, they are noncontractible. 
Nevertheless, to provide some empirical evidence on this question, let us assume for the 
moment that it were possible for the worker and the firm to agree on both a contractual wage rate 
and a magnitude of wage arrears.  If arrears are a disamenity for workers—like danger, risk of 
layoff, or lack of fringe benefits—then there should be a positive compensating differential 
associated with them:  they should be positively related to contractual wages.
17  The standard 
way of estimating the equalizing difference that workers place on such job characteristics is the 
familiar hedonic wage function (e.g., Rosen, 1974), including wage arrears as an independent 
variable, and results from estimating various versions of such a function are displayed in Table 7.  
In some specifications, we instrument the worker’s ω with the district’s Ω.  While the wage 
equations otherwise show fairly standard shapes (large male premium, positive returns to 
schooling, concave profile in experience), in no case does the estimation yield a positive 
coefficient on ω.  The data provide no support for the existence of a trade-off between wage rates 
                                                 
16 Trade union leaders interviewed by the authors in Moscow completely rejected the possibility that the extent of 
wage contract violations could ever be negotiated with management. 
17 It stands to reason that the worker’s utility would be decreasing in the uncertainty of the wage, and empirical 
evidence from public opinion polls has demonstrated that Russian workers consistently place the problem of wage 
arrears as one of the fundamental problems facing their country (see, e.g., Javeline, 2003).   21
and wage arrears, and by implication they reject the notion of an implicit market in the extent to 
which firms keep their wage promises.
18 
Another assumption, important for our identification strategy in estimating the 
neighborhood effects in Section 4 above, is that the model applies to the non-public sector but 
not to employers supported by the state budget, such as schools, hospitals, governmental 
administration, and military producers.  Indeed, while data on the early period are scarce, we 
believe the initial burst of arrears in Russia was caused by the sequestration of budgetary funds 
by the Ministry of Finance in the early and mid-1990s.  Only very incomplete accounts of the 
extent of sequestration are available, but according to many observers the amounts were large.
19  
According to the Institute for the Economy in Transition (1994, p. 35), for example, every 
expenditure line in the fourth quarter of the 1993 federal budget was sequestered by 20 percent.  
Rather than shutting the government down, as occasionally happens in the U.S. during budgetary 
disputes between the president and Congress, the Russian government continued to operate, 
government contractors continued to supply government orders, and state employees continued 
coming to work even when they began to be paid irregularly.  Unfortunately, detailed data on 
these early stages of wage arrears are unavailable to substantiate fully our allegation that the state 
played the role of leader in spreading the practice. 
We are, however, able to examine the related identifying assumption in our empirical 
work that public sector arrears are not subject to the same neighborhood effects as are arrears in 
the non-public sector.  Contrary to the argument above, let us assume that public sector wage 
payments are influenced by Ω, and estimate the magnitude of this effect.  The results are shown 
in Table 8.   Panel A has results for Ω in all firms in the district, while Panel B contains the 
coefficient on Ω in the non-public sector only; which of these is more appropriate depends on 
whether the public sector should be treated as a single employer or as multiple decision-makers.  
In any case, the results show much lower coefficients for an influence of non-public arrears on 
the level of public sector arrears.  The fact that the coefficients are positive does suggest that 
some reverse feedback from non-public arrears to the public sector may be operating, but this 
feedback is clearly much weaker than the responsiveness of arrears in the non-public sector.  
                                                 
18 Furthermore, none of our results in Tables 4–6 and 8–9 are altered more than slightly if we simply drop the wage 
rate from the equations. 
19 The motive for sequestration was to reduce the budget deficit and inflation following price liberalization in 1992; 
the deficit target figured strongly in IMF loan agreements at the time, and some policymakers even boasted of 
sequestration as a clever way to satisfy conditionality.   22
6.  Estimating a Nonlinear Model of Wage Arrears Interactions 
  Returning to the model in Section 3, we obtain the second derivative of the reaction 
function: 
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The second derivative may be positive as well as negative.  Multiple equilibria are more likely, 
of course, if the sign switches.  Such a case, where the second derivative is initially positive and 
then turns negative after Ω exceeds the inflection point Ωι, is shown in Figure 1. 
To motivate this case more fully, we next consider a particular functional form for the 
cost function, one from which we derive an estimable reaction function that permits the 
possibility of multiple equilibria. 
6.1.  A Particular Functional Form for Estimation 
Consider the following special form of the cost function: 
( ) eZ d c b a C + + − − ⋅ =
3 2 Ω Ω Ω ω ω , (15) 
which is the simplest that permits the possibility of multiple symmetric Nash equilibria, as we 
show below.  We will again assume that the cost function satisfies the following features: 
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Parameters a and e are positive by virtue of our earlier assumptions, but we also hypothesize that 
c and d are positive, while the sign of b is ambiguous, for reasons that we discuss shortly.  The 
first-order condition of maximizing the objective function implies the equality of marginal return 
and marginal cost associated with wage arrears: 
( ) eZ d c b a r + + − − − =
3 2    max Ω Ω Ω ω ω ω π
ω  (1’) 
eZ d c b a r + + − − =
3 2 2 Ω Ω Ω ω  (4’) 
From the first order condition we can derive an estimable reaction function:    23
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where ϖ is a cubic function of Ω. 
  The reaction function exhibits positive feedback: 
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  But the sign of the second derivative is ambiguous: 
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depending on c, d, and Ω .  For fixed c and d > 0, the reaction function exhibits a cubic S-shape 
with inflection point at Ωi = c/3d.  At lower levels of local labor market arrears (Ω<c/3d) the 
response function is convex, while at higher levels it is concave.  We test these implications on 
the shape of the reaction function in our empirical analysis below. 
6.2.  Equilibrium Wage Arrears 
In symmetric Nash equilibrium, where all firm managers in a local labor market are 
assumed to face identical return and cost functions and where they take each other’s actions as 
given, the level of firm wage arrears must be equal to the level of regional wage arrears 
(ω*=Ω*), which implies 
0 * ) 2 ( * *
2 3 = − + − + + − eZ r a b c d ω ω ω . (17) 
It is possible to solve this equation analytically for three equilibria in terms of a, b, c, d, e, 
r, and Z, but the equations describing the solutions are very long (several pages each).  To 
simplify for illustrative purposes, we note that r–eZ > 0 implies that even if no other firms in the 
region have wage arrears (Ω=0), the net return to wage arrears is still positive, implying ω > 0.  
Since most economies are characterized by punctual payment of wage obligations, we will 
normalize the results, assuming r=eZ, which also permits us to write out analytical solutions for 
wage arrears equilibria in this special case.  Under this assumption, the three symmetric Nash 
equilibria are: 
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One equilibrium involves zero firm wage arrears at zero regional wage arrears, while positivity 
of two requires that 4d(b-2a)<0, implying restrictions on a and b such that b/2a<1.  The 
parameter b may be positive or negative, although our hypotheses imply a generally positive 
slope of the reaction function. 
We may characterize ω1
* as the “punctual payment equilibrium,” ω2
* as the “critical 
mass” or “threshold equilibrium,” and ω3
* as the “late payment” or “wage arrears equilibrium.”  
An analysis of the stability of these three equilibria in the Appendix shows that ω1
* and ω3
* are 
stable, while ω3
* is unstable.  Figure 2 shows the symmetric Nash equilibria and the dynamics 
implied by the model.  In the range where ω1
* < Ω  < ω2
*, a self-interested manager will choose 
ω < Ω, so optimizing behavior by all managers will tend to drive down Ω.  Beyond ω2
*, 
managerial behavior will tend to push up Ω until it reaches ω3
*, the stable late payment 
equilibrium. 
 
6.3.  Nonlinear Estimation Results  
Multiple equilibria may arise when the reaction function has an S-shape, so that at low 
levels of Ω, ∂
2ω/∂Ω
2 > 0, while at higher levels ∂
2ω/∂Ω
2 < 0.  The functional form of the 
manager’s objective that we have employed as an example (equation (1’) above) suggests a cubic 
form for the reaction function, with alternating signs on the coefficients in the polynomial on Ω.  
More specifically, we can test that the critical parameters c and d are both positive, while b/2a<1. 
We therefore estimate the reaction function (5’).  Decomposing the Z vector of other 
characteristics of workers and firms affecting wage arrears into observable and unobservable 
components leads directly to our estimating equation: 
ωi = β0 + β1Ωi + β2Ωi
2 + β3Ωi
3 + β4Xi + β5Zi’ + ξi, (19) 
where we use the subscript i to index individual workers, and where β1 = b/2a, β2 = c/2a, and β3 
= -d/2a, β4 = r’(Xi)/2a and β5 = -e/2a.  We have decomposed the vector of Z controls to include a   25
constant, β0, a vector of observable characteristics, Zi
’, and a residual reflecting an unobserved 
component in the cost function, εi; thus, Zi = β0 + Zi’ + εi, and ξi = εi/2a.
 
Brock and Durlauf (2001) argue that a nonlinear model of social interactions similar to 
equation (19) is generically identified, but to examine robustness we report both OLS and FE 
estimates.  In fact, as in the linear case, the inclusion of correlated effects at the district, firm, and 
worker level does little to alter the results, which are shown in Table 9.  The results for X and Z 
variables are very similar to those in Table 4 and therefore are not displayed in Table 9, which 
contains our estimates of equation (19). 
Concerning the polynomial in Ω, one of the less obvious predictions of the theoretical 
model, emerging from the discussion above, was that b/2a = β1 < 1.  This implication is satisfied 
by all the estimates in Table 9, and in all cases we can reject the hypothesis that β1 = 1 at the one 
percent level.  This is also a necessary condition for stability of the extreme equilibria.  The signs 
of the estimates of c and d are also consistent with the theoretical model in all four estimated 
models, and they are statistically significant. 
The nonlinear estimation results continue to support the hypothesis of positive 
neighborhood effects over most of the relevant range.  Only when district fixed effects are 
included is β1 statistically significantly less than zero, and even in this case, the reaction function 
is estimated to have a positive slope for Ω > 1.6.  In all cases, the point estimates of the 
coefficients imply an S-shaped reaction function. 
6.4.  Simulating Symmetric Nash Equilibria 
Whether even an S-shaped reaction function produces multiple equilibria depends on the 
magnitudes of the parameters.  Using the estimated parameters of the empirical reaction 
function, we may simulate symmetric Nash equilibria and calculate the levels of arrears 
consistent with the two stable equilibria and with the unstable critical mass threshold. 
Figure 3 graphs the estimated reaction function, taking the average of β0 + β4Xi’ +  β5Zi
’ 
across all individuals in the sample, which then becomes the intercept for the plotted 
relationship.  Under the assumption of symmetric Nash behavior in local labor markets, it is 
straightforward in principle to solve the estimated reaction functions for the set of average 
equilibria across regions.  Figure 3 does this in the simplest way, by finding the intersection 
between the reaction function and a 45° ray from the origin.   26
As is evident from the figure, the results suggest there are indeed multiple equilibria.  The 
average punctual payment equilibrium in Russian regions involves less than one monthly wage 
debt, the critical mass equilibrium is 5.5 months, and the late payment equilibrium is 9.5 months.  
The estimates imply stability of the extreme equilibria ω1* and ω3* and instability of the 
threshold  ω2*.  Thus, the data not only provide support for the model’s most important 
predictions of positive feedback and multiple equilibria, but also for some of the model’s crucial 
details. 
6.5.  Equilibrium Selection, Robustness, and Welfare 
If there are multiple equilibria in wage arrears, how do countries or regions get into the 
punctual payment or the late payment equilibrium?  A natural candidate for selecting the 
equilibrium would be a large employer, big enough to move the equilibrium from one side of the 
critical mass threshold to the other by setting a standard that other employers follow.  In the 
Russian case, we would argue that role was played by the state, which as we have discussed 
initiated late payments on a large scale by budgetary sequestration to reduce the fiscal deficit.  It 
is notable that the share of employment accounted for by the public sector was actually growing 
through most of this standard-setting period.
20 
How robust is the late payment equilibrium?  For instance, while our analysis has focused 
on symmetric Nash equilibria, what prevents some firm, say a new entrant, from violating the 
late-payment norm by offering workers a lower wage, but one paid regularly on time?  Our 
model shows that identical firms will not defect from the late payment equilibrium, but in 
practice there is likely to be heterogeneity, particularly in the case of new start-ups.  Firms with 
profitable opportunities seeking to hire new employees may try to build a reputation for punctual 
payment if workers care about this characteristic of their jobs. 
While such a process may sometimes occur in a number of regions of Russia, in order to 
explain why it does not unravel the late payment equilibrium in regions with persistently high 
arrears we must call upon other aspects of the Russian environment, including the severe 
recession and the continual instability and illiquidity.  The large fall in output and consumption 
has reduced the profitability of entry, and the continual instability has made it difficult for firms 
to establish reputations.  We can imagine a signaling game in which there are two types of firms:  
                                                 
20 According to OECD (1997), employment in public administration grew steadily from 663,000 in 1990 to 
1,087,000 in 1995, or from 0.88 to 1.64 percent of total employment.    27
in one type, where prospects are poor, managers simply try to steal wages; in the others, which 
have profitable projects, they try to pay them and build a reputation in order to increase effort 
and reduce turnover.  But the type of firm is unobservable to workers, and all managers can 
announce (as they do in reality) their most sincere intentions to pay wages “as soon as the firm 
has money.”  In this situation, the ability of the second type of managers to distinguish 
themselves from the first type amounts to the possibility for existence of a separating 
equilibrium.  If economic instability is so great that occasional shocks hit every firm with some 
probability, rendering them temporarily unable to pay, then firms cannot build a reputation and 
workers may not be able to distinguish the firm types in practice.  This analysis is outside our 
formal model, and it is very difficult to verify empirically, but it does explain why a late payment 
equilibrium may be robust even when new entry and firm heterogeneity are permitted. 
Given our argument that the wage payment practice may exhibit multiple equilibria, what 
are the welfare characteristics of the late versus the punctual payment equilibrium?  Layard and 
Richter (1995) and OECD (1997) have praised the use of wage arrears as a way of achieving 
wage flexibility and low unemployment in Russia.  Leaving aside the question of the social 
desirability of wage flexibility, however, it seems to us that wage arrears are far from being a 
socially efficient mechanism for bringing about a given effective change in the real wage. 
As a first welfare consideration, we have noted that wage arrears are unevenly spread 
across regions and households, and thus their social consequences tend to be concentrated in 
certain groups.  Second, wage arrears reduce utility more than equivalent wage cuts because of 
the associated uncertainty concerning the timing and probability of eventual payment.  Third, 
arrears may sometimes actually impede mobility, particularly where arrears are widespread in 
the local labor market; these areas are also likely to be those where mobility—geographic and 
industrial—is most needed.  Thus, wage arrears may actually retard the reallocation of labor that 
is critical to the transition process. 
It seems to us, however, that the major consideration in a normative evaluation of arrears 
stems from the fact that labor contracts are the most important contracts for most individuals.  
The violation of those contracts reduces confidence in other labor and nonlabor contracts into 
which the individual might enter.  In short, wage arrears may undermine the development of 
contract enforcement and rule of law.  North (1990) has argued these are critical institutions in 
promoting impersonal exchange, which in turn explains much about differences in economic   28
growth and performance.  Our analysis provides a case study of the lock-in of an institution that 
we believe, for reasons similar to North’s, to be inimical to the healthy development of a market 
economy in Russia. In such a case, it would be truly paradoxical if the Russian government’s 
attempt to balance the budget was the spark that ignited the wage arrears explosion in the first 
place. 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper has developed and tested some key features of a model of neighborhood 
effects in employer decisions to violate wage contracts.  Our simple model provides a framework 
for understanding how neighborhood effects may arise through the relationship between the costs 
to employers of using arrears and the extent of arrears in the local labor market environment.  It 
also provides some guidance for empirical estimation of the reaction function and of the 
feedback loops that may support a timely or late wage payment practice.  Under certain 
circumstances, the model also suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria, and, assuming a 
particular functional form for the manager’s costs of wage arrears, we have derived an estimable 
nonlinear reaction function. 
Our empirical analysis provides strong evidence of positive feedback in the manager’s 
choice of wage arrears from the behavior of other firms operating in the same local labor market.  
Rational managers do indeed appear to take into account the wage arrears behavior of 
neighboring employers when choosing their own strategies.  This result for the non-public sector 
of the Russian economy is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects at the level of the worker, the 
firm, and the local labor market, and to the use of an instrumental variable associated with the 
exogenous determination of arrears in the public sector.   
Furthermore, the data provide strong support for the model’s key assumptions, including 
the existence of several feedback loops.  We find that higher wage arrears in the local labor 
market attenuate the positive impact of arrears on the worker’s quit probability and the firm’s 
quit rate.  Higher local arrears also reduce the negative impact of a worker’s arrears on measures 
of his/her effort and work hours.  They reduce the positive impact of arrears on the strike 
probability, and they reduce the impact of the level of a firm’s arrears on the probability that a 
legal penalty will be assessed.  The data imply that wage rates can be treated as exogenous to the 
determination of wage arrears, which makes conceptual sense in light of the timing of these 
decisions (annual or bi-annual in the case of wage rates, monthly in the case of arrears) and the   29
impossibility of contracting on arrears, since this would imply a contract to violate a contract.  
The data are also consistent with our hypothesis that the reverse feedback from the non-public to 
the public sector is quite weak. 
The final set of empirical results concern the nonlinear reaction function and the 
possibility of multiple equilibria in wage arrears.  Our estimates of a cubic reaction function, 
derived from a particular functional form for the costs of arrears, imply a clear S-shape.  The 
magnitudes of the parameters imply that the average Russian region may indeed face multiple 
equilibria.  The estimates imply a threshold equilibrium of about 4 monthly wages and a late 
payment equilibrium of 9.5.  We hasten to add that these results are merely illustrative of the 
method that can be used for addressing this issue, but we believe they go a considerable distance 
toward demonstrating the existence of multiple equilibria in the peculiar institution of wage 
arrears. 
Our analysis and results contribute not only to understanding the peculiar phenomenon of 
wage arrears but also to several distinct areas of economic research.  Studies of the historical 
foundations of successful modern economies have emphasized the importance of contract 
enforcement institutions and property rights (Greif, 1993; Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994; 
Milgrom, North, and Weingast, 1990; North, 1990).  While providing explanations for the 
function and origins of such institutions as the merchant guild and the law merchant, however, 
the literature has paid less attention to institutional arrangements when contracts are not enforced 
and to the mechanisms that may lead such arrangements, even if inferior, to be self-sustaining.  
A second strand of literature is concerned directly with coordination failures, particularly in 
developing economies, where the possibility of an “underdevelopment trap” due to investment 
spillovers has been studied by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1989), and extended to human capital investment by Azariadis and Drazen (1990); Hoff (2000) 
contains an overview.  This research, however, does not consider the breakdown of contract 
enforcement as a possible case of coordination failure, as we do in this paper. 
The broad notion that spillovers create positive feedback and possibly multiple equilibria 
in outcomes appears in a number of fields.  For instance, externalities may help to explain 
persistent regional variation in crime rates, whether due to legal congestion (Sah, 1991) or social 
interactions and learning (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996).  Network externalities 
may create multiple equilibria and path dependence in technology adoption (David, 1985; Katz   30
and Shapiro, 1986; Arthur, 1989).  Spillovers in investment, market participation, or technology 
may produce the possibility of multiple levels of equilibrium aggregate output and employment 
(Cooper and John, 1988; Kiyotaki, 1988; Chamley, 1999).  Some efficiency wage models (e.g., 
Stiglitz, 1985) also rely on an externality for other firms when an employer chooses to pay a 
wage premium either to lower quits or to increase effort, and it has been argued that employers’ 
layoff and training decisions and employee investments in training contain similar externalities 
(Levine and Parkin, 1994; Acemoglu, 1997).  The general class of games with strategic 
complementarities has been extensively analyzed by Milgrom and Roberts (1990), among others, 
while the essays in Blume and Durlauf (2001) consider a variety of issues in the area of social 
dynamics.   
In all of these examples, a broadly similar interaction mechanism works to promote 
convergent practices, and, depending on parameters, the positive feedback may generate multiple 
equilibria.  Empirical analyses of the phenomena are relatively few, however, perhaps because 
appropriate data are frequently not available, because testing has been hampered by difficult 
identification problems, and because it is usually difficult to observe feedback mechanisms.  In 
this paper, we have addressed these problems using rich panel data that permit us to control for 
correlated effects that typically confound inferences in interactions-based models, and we have 
exploited a useful instrumental variable arising from an exogenous policy intervention.  We have 
also been able to measure several mechanisms that may function as feedback loops supporting 
multiple equilibria in the institution of timeliness of wage payment. 
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on the role of institutional change in 
economic development and in the transition from socialism.  A major theme in the literature is 
the importance of new institutions that should be created for markets to function well (e.g., 
Murrell, 1992; Dewatripont and Roland, 1996; Greif and Kandel, 1995), but less attention has 
been paid to the possibility of the evolution of institutions that not only fail to support the 
functioning of markets but actually serve to undermine them.  Although a complete welfare 
analysis is beyond the scope of the paper, we have argued that pervasive wage arrears practices 
have perverse consequences for the development of enforceable contracts and secure property 
rights, arguably among the most important institutions of a market economy.   31
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Appendix.   
 
To check the three equilibria in Section 6.2 for stability, we may calculate the slope of the 
reaction function at the equilibrium points.  Stable equilibria should have a reaction function 
slope less than one:  
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We may check this condition for each equilibrium in turn.  ω1* is clearly stable: 
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Finally, the third equilibrium is stable:   1
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Thus, we have found three equilibria and showed that two of them are stable and one is not 
stable.  Figure 2 shows the symmetric Nash equilibria and the dynamics implied by the model.  
In the range where ω1
* < Ω  < ω2
*, a self-interested manager will choose ω < Ω, so optimizing 
behavior by all managers will tend to drive down Ω.  Beyond ω2
*, managerial behavior will tend 
to push up Ω until it reaches ω3
*, the stable late payment equilibrium.   36
Table 1:  Magnitude of Wage Arrears, Worker Data 
  1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 
E(ωt)   1.10 1.11 1.92 3.00 1.14 
       
E(ωt ⏐ω t > 0)   2.75 2.73 3.27 4.82 4.24 
       
Unconditional Distribution (ωt)       
ωt   = 0 month  0.603  0.593  0.415 0.379 0.731 
=  1  month  0.149 0.156 0.149 0.122 0.111 
=  2-3  months  0.164 0.170 0.250 0.219 0.085 
=  4-6  months  0.055 0.055 0.134 0.163 0.032 
=  7-9  months  0.014 0.007 0.025 0.046 0.007 
>  9  months  0.016 0.019 0.028 0.072 0.034 
          
E(Ωt) in Selected Districts          
“A”  0.417 0.478 1.167 1.080 0.407 
“B”  0.627 0.480 0.593 1.256 0.137 
“C”  2.236 2.274 3.574 4.301 1.408 
“D”  4.119 6.581 6.175  11.690 9.898 
         
N  4667 4310 4050  3781  4000 
 
Notes:  ωt = number of monthly wages reported overdue by an employee-respondent in year t; Ωt = average number 
of monthly wages owed in the rest of the firm’s local labor market.  Sample consists of all employee-respondents in 
the RLMS.  Districts are indicated as “A” through “D” because the RLMS data confidentiality agreement precludes 
the release of district names. 
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Table 2:  Characteristics of the Worker Sample 
Variable  Mean Variable Mean 
Male  0.473  Hourly Wage Rate (rubles)  12.094 
Schooling (years)  11.851    (20.033) 
  (2.524)  Family Income (thous.rubles)  0.961 
Age (years)  39.024    (1.775) 
 (11.800)  Industry   
Tenure (years)  8.180  Mining  0.023 
 (9.068)  Machine  Building  0.109 
Employee Owns    Light and Food  0.049 
No shares  0.813  Other Manufacturing  0.102 
<1% 0.105  Agriculture/Forestry  0.101 
≥1%  0.036 Transportation  0.077 
No information  0.046  Construction  0.071 
Occupation   Private  Services  0.140 
Managers 0.039  Public  Services  0.329 
Professionals 0.155     
Technicians 0.177  Public  Sector  0.367 
Clerks  0.072  Ωt (local arrears)  1.612 
Service Workers  0.096    (1.472) 
Craft Workers  0.175  Monthly Hours of Work  147.804 
Operators and Assemblers  0.179    (73.686) 
Unskilled Workers  0.094  Desire to Switch Jobs  0.383 
Army  0.013  Quit in Two Years  0.291 
 
Notes:  N=19316, except for hours (N=18556), desire to switch jobs (N=18812), and quits (N=9119).  Sample consists of 
all employee-respondents with non-missing values on wage arrears, schooling, age, tenure, occupation, and industry.   
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.   38
Table 3:  Characteristics of the Firm Sample 
Variable  Mean Variable Mean 
ωt (number of monthly   1.175  Industry   
wages overdue)  (2.375)  Energy & Fuel  0.088 
Ωt (local arrears)  1.146  Metallurgy & Chemicals  0.081 
 (1.321)  Machine  Building  0.318 
Strikes (dummy)  0.019  Wood and Building Materials  0.105 
Quit Rate (quits/employment)  0.169 Light  0.089 
  (0.169) Food  0.135 
Legal Penalties (dummy)  0.010 Other  0.060 
Union Density (% members)    Agriculture  0.123 
0-9%  0.086  Type of Location   
10-59%  0.095  Moscow and St. Petersburg  0.105 
60-79%  0.088  Regional Capital City  0.360 
80-89% 0.087  Other  City  0.342 
90-99% 0.275  Non-City  0.194 
100% 0.369  Legal  Environment   
Firm Fringe Benefits     Fraction of cases when managers   0.098 
Training  0.647  failed to pay assessed fines on time  (0.085) 
Kindergartens  0.433  Fraction of cases when arrears were   0.216 
Housing  0.382  paid off after violation was   (0.158) 
Training Costs (days) /100  82.022  discovered   
 (92.850)     
 
Notes:  N=4061, except for quit rate (N=2611) and legal penalties (N=3675).  Sample consists of industrial and 
agricultural firms with non-missing values on wage arrears, union density, and fringe benefits in 1991–1999.  Standard 
deviations are shown in parentheses.  The quit rate is ratio of number quitting to average employment.   39
Table 4:  Estimates of the Linear Reaction Function, Non-Public Sector 
  OLS IV/2SLS  IV/2SLS, 
District FE 
IV/2SLS, 
Firm FE 
IV/2SLS, 
Worker FE 
Ωt (local arrears)   0.894*** 0.905***  0.777***  1.030*** 0.991*** 
  (0.088) (0.071)  (0.142)  (0.105) (0.095) 
Male 0.358***  0.357***  0.348***  0.360***  … 
 (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.110)  (0.106)   
Schooling (years)  0.002  0.003  -0.005  -0.015  -0.063* 
  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.022) (0.036) 
Age (years)  0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.010**  … 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)   
Tenure  (years)  0.026*** 0.026***  0.028***  0.020*** 0.037*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) (0.007) 
Hourly Wage Rate (rubles)  -0.003**  -0.003**  -0.005***  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Family Income (thous.rubles)  -0.012  -0.011  -0.028**  -0.008  -0.015 
  (0.016) (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.024) (0.023) 
Employee Owns (omitted: No Shares) 
<1% 0.252**  0.252***  0.292***  0.187*  0.330*** 
  (0.094) (0.094)  (0.089)  (0.113) (0.120) 
≥1%  0.168 0.166  0.157  0.113 0.299* 
  (0.167) (0.164)  (0.144)  (0.188) (0.182) 
No information  0.274  0.274  0.306  0.342**  0.384** 
  (0.221) (0.216)  (0.207)  (0.146) (0.151) 
Year  1995  0.007 0.007  0.008  0.029 0.022 
  (0.058) (0.058)  (0.061)  (0.100) (0.088) 
Year  1996  0.082 0.073  0.198  0.168 0.178 
  (0.087) (0.073)  (0.133)  (0.140) (0.123) 
Year  1998  0.250 0.229*  0.495*  0.350 0.189 
  (0.178) (0.126)  (0.266)  (0.240) (0.208) 
Year 2000  0.119  0.118  0.151  0.437***  0.293*** 
  (0.131) (0.129)  (0.145)  (0.111) (0.102) 
Intercept  -1.118** -1.133**  -0.873**  -1.246** -0.648 
  (0.522) (0.510)  (0.398)  (0.551) (0.492) 
R
2 overall  0.241 0.241  0.260  0.160 0.231 
  First Stage Results for Excluded Instrument 
n
b
tΩ
b
t (weighted local arrears   ...  2.110*** 1.631***  1.685***  1.658*** 
in the public sector)    (0.032)  (0.024)  (0.029)  (0.031) 
R
2 first stage  ...  0.512  0.882  0.389  0.397 
F-test of excluded instruments  ...  4247.45  4687.06  3289.40  2786.99 
 
Notes:  N=12306 employee-respondents in the non-public sector.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *–significant at 
10%; **–significant at 5%; ***–significant at 1%.  Standard errors in columns 1 through 3 are adjusted for clustering on 
district.  9 occupation dummies, 9 industry dummies, and 2 dummies for missing values of wages and family income are 
included but not shown here.   40
Table 5:  Costs of Wage Arrears, Results from Worker Data 
  Quit in  
Two Years 
(Probit, dF/dX)
Desire to 
 Switch Jobs  
(Probit, dF/dX) 
Hours of Work 
(Tobit) 
ωt (number of monthly wages overdue)  0.009*** 0.024***  -1.463*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.260) 
Ωt (local arrears)  -0.002 0.000  -0.741 
  (0.009) (0.006) (0.891) 
ωt*Ωt  -0.001* -0.002***  0.170*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.052) 
Male 0.060***  -0.028***  29.076*** 
  (0.012) (0.009) (1.231) 
Schooling  (years)  -0.011*** 0.010*** 0.546** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.272) 
Age (years)  0.002***  -0.008***  0.275*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) 
Tenure  (years)  -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.300*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.066) 
Hourly Wage Rate (rubles)/10  -0.002  -0.016***  -7.314*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.273) 
Family Income (thous.rubles)/100  0.124  -0.337  -95.093*** 
 (0.338)  (0.242)  (30.512) 
Employee Owns (omitted: No Shares)       
<1% -0.042***  0.006  0.313 
  (0.016) (0.013) (1.784) 
≥1%  -0.004 -0.085***  19.771*** 
  (0.026) (0.019) (2.784) 
No information  -0.050**  -0.031*  -2.195 
  (0.021) (0.018) (2.518) 
Year 1995  ...  -0.011  6.748*** 
   (0.011)  (1.538) 
Year 1996  -0.004  -0.021  10.287*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (1.742) 
Year 1998  -0.003  -0.048***  -13.217*** 
  (0.020) (0.016) (2.309) 
Year 2000  ...  -0.014  -7.937*** 
   (0.011)  (1.573) 
Intercept ...  ...  143.926*** 
     (5.124) 
N 9119  18812  18556 
LR chi
2 / Wald chi
2 771.938  2038.743  7221.371 
Pseudo R
2  0.077 0.089 0.036 
 
Notes:  Sample consists of all employee-respondents in the RLMS.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *–significant at 
10%; **–significant at 5%; ***–significant at 1%.  9 occupation dummies, 9 industry dummies, 52 district dummies, and 2 
dummies for missing values of wages and family income are included but not shown here.   41
Table 6:  Costs of Wage Arrears, Results from Firm Data 
  Quit Rate 
(OLS) 
Strikes 
(Probit, dF/dX) 
Legal Penalties 
(Probit, dF/dX) 
ωt (number of monthly wages   0.010*** 0.003*** 0.0006** 
overdue) (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.0003) 
Ωt (local arrears)  -0.001 0.002**  0.0004 
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.0003) 
ωt*Ωt  -0.002** -0.001***  -0.0001** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.0001) 
Union density (100% is omitted)       
0-9% 0.047**  -0.001  … 
 (0.023)  (0.003)   
10-59% 0.024**  0.002  … 
 (0.012)  (0.004)   
60-79% -0.009  0.009  … 
 (0.011)  (0.006)   
80-89% -0.000  0.004  … 
 (0.011)  (0.004)   
90-100% 0.002  0.000  … 
 (0.006)  (0.003)   
Fringe benefits provided by firms (dummies)     
Training -0.020**  0.004**  … 
 (0.008)  (0.002)   
Kindergartens -0.011  -0.001  … 
 (0.007)  (0.002)   
Housing purchase and   -0.009  0.003  … 
construction (0.006)  (0.002)   
Training costs (days) /100  -0.009***  0.002***  … 
 (0.003)  (0.001)   
Type of location (Moscow and St. Petersburg are omitted)     
Regional Capital City  0.014  0.009  0.0001 
 (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.0008) 
Other City  0.026**  0.004  -0.0021** 
 (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.0010) 
Non-City -0.028*  -0.004  -0.0016* 
 (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.0008) 
Legal Environment       
Fraction of cases when managers   …  …  -0.0091** 
failed to pay assessed fines on time      (0.0042) 
Fraction of cases when arrears   …  …  -0.0057** 
were paid off after violation was 
discovered 
  (0.0026) 
N  2611 4061 3984 
R
2  0.137 0.241 0.303 
 
Notes:  Sample consists of industrial and agricultural firms.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *–significant at 10%; 
**–significant at 5%; ***–significant at 1%.  Intercept and dummies for years, industries, and non-reported training costs 
are included but not shown here.   42
Table 7:  Testing Model Assumptions –  
Hedonic Wage Function, Non-Public Sector 
  OLS IV/2SLS  IV/2SLS, 
District FE 
IV/2SLS, 
Firm FE 
IV/2SLS, 
Worker FE
ωt (number of monthly   -0.040*** -0.161*** -0.022 -0.024**  -0.032** 
wages  overdue)  (0.008) (0.052) (0.033) (0.010) (0.013) 
Male 0.346*** 0.400*** 0.367*** 0.291***  … 
  (0.026) (0.031) (0.025) (0.021)   
Schooling (years)  0.039*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.025***  0.250 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.299) 
Potential Experience (years)  0.019*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.025***  0.278 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.300) 
Potential Experience
2   -0.042*** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.051***  -0.094***
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.015) 
Tenure (years)  0.001  0.004*  0.003**  0.007***  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Log of Monthly Hours  0.233*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.130***  0.079***
  (0.028) (0.033) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023) 
Employee Owns (omitted: No Shares)         
<1% 0.146*** 0.175*** 0.084*** 0.114***  0.073***
  (0.047) (0.047) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) 
≥1%  0.211*** 0.244*** 0.226*** 0.108*** 0.071* 
  (0.047) (0.054) (0.042) (0.037) (0.041) 
No  information  0.092* 0.133**  0.068* 0.041  0.014 
  (0.050) (0.064) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) 
Year 1995  -0.045*  -0.041*  -0.054*** -0.073***  -0.301 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.300) 
Year 1996  0.095*** 0.201*** 0.091**  0.058**  -0.380 
  (0.032) (0.049) (0.044) (0.024) (0.599) 
Year 1998  -0.249*** -0.008  -0.268*** -0.276***  -1.176 
  (0.029) (0.087) (0.071) (0.033) (1.197) 
Year 2000  -0.220*** -0.191*** -0.180*** -0.214***  -1.578 
  (0.042) (0.050) (0.041) (0.022) (1.796) 
Intercept 5.269*** 5.366*** 5.597*** 6.101***  -0.676 
  (0.179) (0.204) (0.103) (0.147) (9.121) 
R
2 overall  0.323 0.128 0.458 0.271 0.005 
 
Notes:  N=11363 employee-respondents in the non-public sector.  Dependent variable is log of real monthly contractual wage 
at the primary job.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *–significant at 10%; **–significant at 5%; ***–significant at 
1%.  Standard errors in columns 1 through 3 are adjusted for clustering of districts.  The excluded instrument is Ωt (local 
arrears).  9 occupation dummies, 9 industry dummies, and 2 dummies for missing values of wages and family income are 
included but not shown here.  First-stage results are not reported but they are similar to Table 4.   43
Table 8:  Testing Model Assumptions –  
Linear Reaction Function, Public Sector 
  OLS  District FE  Firm FE  Worker FE 
Panel A      
Ωt (local arrears)  0.404*** 0.298*** 0.404*** 0.469*** 
  (0.061) (0.076) (0.054) (0.057) 
Male  0.080 0.071 0.008  … 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.134)   
Schooling  (years)  0.007  0.015 -0.000 -0.029 
  (0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.040) 
Age (years)  -0.006  -0.006  0.002  … 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)   
Tenure  (years)  0.027*** 0.027*** 0.010*  0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) 
Hourly Wage Rate (rubles)  -0.006***  -0.006**  -0.007***  -0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Family Income (thous.rubles)  -0.024*  -0.017  -0.038*  -0.039* 
  (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.024) 
Year  1995  0.076 0.077 0.065 0.039 
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.097) (0.099) 
Year  1996  0.678*** 0.779*** 0.707*** 0.586*** 
  (0.100) (0.106) (0.109) (0.113) 
Year  1998  1.301*** 1.508*** 1.442*** 1.269*** 
  (0.185) (0.219) (0.147) (0.154) 
Year  2000  0.125 0.111 0.216**  0.269** 
  (0.113) (0.116) (0.109) (0.116) 
Intercept  0.224  -0.005 0.289 0.925 
  (0.240) (0.220) (0.417) (0.579) 
R
2 overall  0.136 0.150 0.125 0.120 
 
Panel B      
Ω
n
t (local arrears in the non-  0.305*** 0.270*** 0.286*** 0.353*** 
public sector)  (0.046) (0.085) (0.043) (0.047) 
R
2 overall  0.132 0.151 0.121 0.092 
 
Notes:  N=7010 employee-respondents in the public sector.  The budgetary sector consists of municipal utilities, public services 
such as health care, education, and government, and defense industries.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *–
significant at 10%; **–significant at 5%; ***–significant at 1%.  Standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are adjusted for clustering 
of districts.  The public sector has neither industry categories nor employee ownership.  9 occupation dummies and 2 dummies 
for missing values of wages and family income are included but not shown here.   44
Table 9:  Non-Linear Reaction Function of Wage Arrears, Non-Public Sector 
  OLS  District FE  Firm FE  Worker FE 
Ω  (local arrears)   -0.249 -0.896**  -0.130  0.043 
  (0.402) (0.423) (0.179) (0.160) 
Ω
2  0.304**  0.333*** 0.240*** 0.173*** 
  (0.122) (0.116) (0.037) (0.034) 
Ω
3  -0.019**  -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.010*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) 
R
2  0.250 0.267 0.150 0.235 
 
Notes:  N=12306 employee-respondents in the non-public sector.  Robust standard errors in parentheses; *–significant at 10%; 
**–significant at 5%; ***–significant at 1%.  Standard errors in columns 1 and 2 are adjusted for clustering on district.  The 
equations in this table also include all the other variables in Table 4, but the results for these variables are very similar and 
therefore not shown here. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Non-Linear Reaction Function of Wage Arrears 
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Figure 2:  Symmetric Nash Equilibria 
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Figure 3:  Estimated Nonlinear Reaction Function 
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